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In the past decade, South Africa has undergone radical transitions in government,
social integration, and direction. The most remarkable is the restructuring of the military,
which included integration of former homeland defense units, the South African Defense
Force (SADF), Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA - a military arm of the PAC),
and the incorporation of Um Khonto we Sizwe (MK - militant wing of the ANC)
members into the new South African National Defense Force (SANDF). The new
democratic government implemented civilian control measures and added transparency to
all military operations. The integration and transition led to drastic downsizing of the
active component, new involvement of the reserves, drastic cuts in military spending and
complete reorganization of the Ministry of Defense. Today, success of the young
democracy depends on the state's ability to address plaguing social crisis of education,
housing, unemployment, and AIDS. Simply put, South Africans face limitless challenges
with severe economic and financial constraints. Already the benchmarks highlighted in
the 1998 Defence and Review and 1996 White Paper on Defence are no longer viable due
to budget constraints.
This thesis argues that given severe budget limitations, significant social issues,
and increasing economic concerns, the Reserve Force can play a crucial role in South
Africa's future in terms of regional stability and democratic stability within its borders.
The thesis also asserts that a well-structured reserve facilitates a smaller active force
while improving countrywide social conditions and minimizing Ministry of Defense
budgetary requirements.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Given the prominence of severe budget limitations, significant social issues, and
increasing economic concerns, the Reserve Force (RF) can play a crucial role in South
Africa's future in terms of regional stability and democratic stability within its borders,
because a well-structured reserve facilitates a smaller active force while improving
countrywide social conditions and minimizing Ministry of Defense budgetary
requirements. However, budget requirements are not the only consideration.
The primary obstacles regarding RF integration into the South African National
Defence Force (SANDF) are the support and acceptance by the citizens and a need for
clear state strategy regarding roles and missions. The RF in itself does not solve the
internal issues of South Africa. However, with continued transformation and inclusion in
the state security planning process, the RF can
• Reduce defense budget requirements while enhancing the overall combat
capabilities of the SANDF through task force assistance;
• Create a larger more representative civilian participation in defense matters
through local RF units and improve apartheid perceptions of Commandos and
military personnel;
• Provide an opportunity for labor skill education to unskilled citizens, which
enhances the economic capabilities of South African citizens;
• Provide assistance to local SAPS; and
• Allow for international peacekeeping exchanges between South Africa and
other nations.
It is the state's responsibility to ensure the RF receives the necessary resources and
guidance to achieve the desired end state. These responsibilities are as follows:
ix
• Allocate state funds specifically for the RF;
• Ensure soldiers receive pay and benefits equal to the active component;
• Pass legislation protecting citizen-soldier employer rights; and
• Establish and ensure uniform standards for all military personnel.
In sum, memories of apartheid, race relations, inequality of wealth and resources,
and pressures from various stakeholders and economic factions amplify social and force-
planning complexities. Inclusion and utilization into the civilian controlled military of a
Reserve Force requires cooperation on all levels from citizens, government, and military
personnel.
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"It is universally acknowledged that in a democracy the Citizen in Uniform, the part-time
soldier, is an indispensable element ofa country 's defense.
"
- Joe MoDise, Minister of Defense, 5 June 1996
A. Background and Summary of the Argument
Among the most transparent and open debates in South Africa today is redefining
South African National Defense Force (SANDF), in mission and force structure. There
are four major positions in the debates concerning the future of the SANDF. They are:
• The defense force is unneeded;
• The defense force should be designed primarily to execute internal security;
tasks in support of the South African Police Service (SAPS);
• The defense force should be focused primarily on peace missions; and
• The defense force should have a conventional defense role.
Earlier recommendations on restructuring the SANDF within the 1996 White
Paper on Defense and the 1998 Defense Review have already been scrapped, because,
simply stated, South Africa cannot afford the costs of a large standing army. This thesis
argues that given the prominence of severe budget limitations, significant social issues,
and increasing economic concerns, the Reserve Force can play a crucial role in South
Africa's future in terms of regional stability and democratic stability within its borders.
The thesis also asserts that a well-structured reserve facilitates a smaller active force
1
while improving countrywide social conditions and minimizing Ministry of Defense
budgetary requirements.
In South Africa, memories of apartheid, race relations, inequality of wealth and
resources, and pressures from various stakeholders and economic factions amplify force-
planning complexities.
Three things appear certain in South Africa today.
The Reserve Force is a part of an overall solution, not a fully comprehensive
response to social, political, and racial issues.
South Africa is a regional leader that must have a strong military to legitimize
its future political dealings.
South Africa's current Reserve Force requires management focus on all levels
if it is to reduce its perceived threat to its neighbors.
A reorganized military with emphasis on the reserves, can meet South Africa's defense
requirements in the 21 st century. The success of solution, which incorporates a reserve
component, depends on civilians overcoming apartheid perceptions of the reserves,
streamlining and integrating active and reserve roles and missions, and ensuring that the
government bridge employer reservist gaps.
An improved Reserve Force loosely based on the roles of the American National
Guard as part of a total state program provides a tested base to assist with internal
domestic issues, but it is not a solution in itself. The existing institutions in South Africa
can support a redesigned Reserve Force. Nevertheless, equally important, is that society
accept and support the Reserve Force. Changes within the Reserve Force will impact the
designs of the Active Component leading to the question of will the military accept
increased involvement of the Reserve Force into its existing structure? Second, who will
be responsible for training and evaluation of the Reserve Force? Third, will the already
limited military defense budget have the ability to support the organization? Finally, how
will the state utilize the Modified Reserve Force and will society and military view it as
legitimate? Induction of an increased Reserve Force role creates additional structural and
economic reform challenges.
B. Importance of the Topic
As the world moves towards democracy, a government's ability to balance and
manage security and military needs with other social requirements becomes its
primary role. In this sense, South Africa is not an anomaly; rather it reflects a global
trend towards democratic consolidation. Other countries, specifically those divided
racially and culturally, can apply the lessons learned from the peaceful transition in
South Africa.
The South African National Defense Forces continued transition is critical to the
success of South Africa's democracy. It plays an important role in regional security
in Southern Africa and future African development south of the Sahara. A summary
of the present situation follows:
• South Africa has the largest and most advanced military in southern Africa.
• The challenges facing South Africa require a combined military and
government cooperative effort.
• South Africa's GDP is approximately four times larger than the other eleven
southern African states combined.
• Political success in South Africa will likely influence the future of much of
Africa.
• South Africa's neighboring states do not present an external threat. Thus, the
state can use the SANDF and Reserve Force as auxiliary law enforcement
with the South African Police Service (SAPS).
• South Africa could become embroiled in their resolution at the behest, for
example, of the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) or
the Southern African Development Community (SADC).
• Reorganization and utilization of the Reserve Force will provide opportunity
for desperately needed labor skills within the country, while employing many
of the nation's unemployed and is less threatening to its neighbors.
• South Africa is the only nuclear capable state to surrender its nuclear arsenal.
From an American strategic and peacekeeping standpoint, success in South Africa
provides relief from potential future United States deployments and an opportunity for
military exchange on a state-to-state basis. Transition in South Africa has led to difficult
and abrupt systemic changes, but the government must accomplish more if it is to serve
its people and assume the pivotal role in southern African affairs.
C. Methodology
The basis of this thesis is a case study designed to test the plausibility of the adoption
of a reserve force in South Africa according to military, civilian, and government
documents addressing the transition process in South Africa. These documents include:
• The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa
• The White Paper on Defence, "Defence in Democracy," 1996
• The Defence Review, 1998
I have conducted interviews with members of the South African Ministry of
Defense, Consulate, and military, and have related my experiences as an American
citizen-soldier and former South African resident to the process. My intent was to
address both the social and defense issues regarding continued transformation of the
SANDF.
Chapter II of this thesis deals with the evolution and social aspects leading to the
negotiated transition in South Africa. Chapter HI describes the status and situation of the
SANDF and the goals for future structure. Chapter IV addresses Reserve Force options.
Chapter V concludes by recommending a restructuring and change in the existing
Reserve Force policy.
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II. GHOSTS IN THE FUTURE
Reserve forces require the support of citizens and government to establish
legitimacy but in South Africa, fractionalization and apartheid memories debilitate the
civil-military relationship. This chapter will reveal that negotiations in South Africa
involved factional sub-negotiations between whites and Africans and that the negotiations
affected other agencies, specifically the military. The chapter addresses five topics:
• The history of apartheid and the beginning of organized black resistance;
• International influence;
• The formal negotiations and transition to a free election;
• The organization of the post-apartheid state; and
• Post-transition problems and the transition's impact on the South African
military.
A. Apartheid Foundation and Black Resistance
The purpose of discussing the origins of apartheid is threefold.
• Whites disagreed during the 1990 negotiations over the regime transition.
• African opposition to apartheid grew as the government implemented its racial
policy.
• Afrikaner elitism under apartheid united military, police, and government
agencies, which in turn, attempted to block a negotiated settlement of black
political participation.
The term Apartheid comes from Afrikaans word meaning "apartness." In the
1920s and 1930s, the term reflected a desire for white development and the removal of
7
English South Africans from positions of power. The largely agrarian Afrikaners
believed that the English dominated businesses and that government positions filled by
Englishmen discriminated against them. Further, the "armed force was used more
frequently against white workers and Afrikaners than against blacks." 1 The election of
Daniel Francois Malan's National Party in 1948 was the result of an Afrikaner coalition
with two specific agendas; ensure Afrikaner control of the military and government and
maintain white control of South Africa. "Afrikaners were deeply worried about the state
of race relations. Nearly all believed that the state should do more to maintain white
supremacy and the "purity" of the "white" race.'"" The transition of apartheid from an
idea to action was immediate.
The National Party laid the foundation of apartheid in 1950 with the passage of
the Population Registration Act, which classified people by race; the Group Areas Act,
which forced people to reside in racially zoned areas; and the Immorality Act, which
created legal boundaries between the races by making marriage and sexual relations
across color lines illegal. The repeal of these acts was a key step in the negotiation
process. Further, the election of the National Party virtually excluded the English from
political and military power. "Afrikaner hegemony was extended over senior posts in the
civil service and armed forces, from which a number of English were unceremoniously
retired."
3
In the eyes of Afrikaners, control of the government was its manifest destiny.
1





This Afrikaner perspective led to the creation of an apartheid system that eliminated
black participation and ensured that Afrikaners dominated the political process.
Bolstered by the National Party dominated Parliament, the military became a key
element in Afrikaner pride and equality. In the early stages of apartheid, some military
personnel objected to the treatment of Africans. For a short time, a few World War II
veterans used two organizations that opposed racial segregation — the War Veteran's
Torch Commando and the Springbok Legion — to lobby for African equality. However,
Afrikaner politics soon influenced the organizations and after a protest march on
Parliament turned violent, the Torch Commandos closed their doors to non-white
members in 1951.4 Nevertheless, in the early stages of the apartheid government, the
military worked with the South African Police Service (SAPS) to enforce apartheid
policy.
As the apartheid government strengthened, so too did black resistance.
Unfortunately, the Africans lacked an organized armed military or a legitimate
institutional way to overcome their disadvantaged position. Further, in 1951, the
apartheid government abolished the Natives Representation Council, an advisory body
established in 1936 that had little success in getting redress for African grievances with
the white government. 5 To Africans, apartheid left little opportunity for equality. An
attempt by anti-apartheid groups comprised of the African National Congress (ANC),
South African Indian Congress (SAIC), and the Congress of Democrats, to sign a
4
Annette Seegers, The Military in the Making of Modern South Africa (New York: Tauris Academic
Studies 1996) 93.
Christopher Saunders, ed., Historical Dictionary of South Africa (Maryland: Scarecrow Press, 2000)
190.
Freedom Charter in 1955 resulted in 156 of its members charged with high treason. In
1960, the Pan-African Congress (PAC) peacefully protested the pass-laws, which
required each African to carry an identification passbook at all times. The protest in
Sharpsville ended tragically with 67 killed, many shot in the back, by members of the
SAPS, and resulted a government ban of all African political organizations. Banishing
political organizations in 1960 left little hope for a democratic and peaceful solution to
South African inequality.
B. International Influence
The Soweto Uprising in 1976 marks the beginning of apartheid's demise and
greater state utilization of Commandos against black citizens. It began as a revolt by
schoolchildren in Soweto, a township south of Johannesburg, against the government's
insistence that African schools use Afrikaans to teach. This protest soon spread
throughout the country. The ANC, banned in 1960, used the revolt to foster ideas about
black consciousness. In retaliation, the government called out SAPS and military
personnel to stop the revolt. By the protest's end in 1977, the security forces had shot an
estimated 600 people, most of them teenagers. Steve Biko, founder of the South African
Student Organization and leader of the black consciousness movement, died while in
police custody. Now fearing the security forces and fueled by Biko's death, thousands of
Africans fled abroad and joined a growing struggle for liberation. The harsh tactics of
security forces led to international condemnation and a United Nations (UN) arms
embargo against South Africa in spring 1977. South Africans seriously questioned the
10
apartheid regime's legitimacy.
6 With international awareness of the condition of
Africans in South Africa growing, the liberation movement strengthened both inside and
outside South Africa. Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), the militant wing of the ANC
established in 1961, continued to train freedom fighters outside South Africa's borders.
Joined by members of the PAC and other political exiles, the MK prepared Africans for
an armed struggle, while it conducted small-scale attacks against the apartheid regime.
The white government did not think the ANC led the opposition in 1976, but with the
influx of newly trained guerillas, this perception changed.7
International pressure and increased attacks—both more frequent and aggressive
—
by MK groups forced the South African government to acknowledge a need for change.
In 1986, South African President Pieter Willem Botha declared a state of emergency in
South Africa and thought the growing opposition required a military solution. He had
been Minister of Defense from 1966 to 1978 and had built the South African army into
the most formidable military machine in Africa. He claimed that the international
community was waging a "total onslaught" against South Africa and gave the military a
major say in the government. 8 To many observers Botha was a "militarist," because of
his blunt action, limited collegiality, and long association with the military.9 Declaring a
state of emergency simply reinforced this perception.
Botha's strategy was to divide and conquer. He and the NP leadership believed
that the government institutions, supported by the military and security forces, could








divide, co-opt, and neutralize the ANC and the anti-apartheid struggle. 10 Under the guise
of counter-insurgency operations (COIN) and the support of the 1983 constitution, which
dramatically increased the executive power of the State President, the military and SAPS
conducted township raids. Parliamentary oversight was minimal because the Minister of
Defense reported directly to the State President. As a result, military personnel kept
Parliamentarians out of defense affairs because they believed political involvement
supported South Africa's enemies. 11 The NP portrayed the ANC and the South African
Communist Party (SACP) as evil.
As violence by the security forces increased under the state of emergency so too
did armed acts by the MK against the white government and establishment. The state of
emergency made whites prisoners of their own political system and dependent on
Commandos and the South African Defence Force (SADF) for protection. Further, as the
state of emergency spread, foreign businesses began to systematically leave South Africa
and international banks called in short term loans. Several world powers, including the
United States, placed sanctions on South Africa because of its apartheid policy, which in
turn, created inflation, economic instability, and made South Africa a pariah state. South
Africa was heading for bloodshed and Botha was leading the charge.
To improve South Africa's world standing and gain English-speaking South
Africans' support, Botha made several nominal concessions without sacrificing Afrikaner
power.
• He tried to neutralize South Africa's neighbors.




• He scrapped apartheid symbols and practices not needed to maintain white
supremacy.
• He sought to win the cooperation of big business, to intensify the ethnic and
class cleavages among citizens, and to suppress domestic dissidents.
• He attempted to legalize formerly illegal democratically organized labor
unions that had become a form of internal African and white-activist protest.
Parliament passed a new constitution giving Coloureds and Indians voting rights within
the apartheid system, but it still excluded blacks from the political process and it
maintained executive veto privileges. 12 In January 1985, speaking in Parliament, Botha
offered to free Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners on three specific conditions:
the ANC would renounce violence, the ANC would break from the SACP, and the ANC
would abandon the majority rule principle; an offer Mandela refused, because he and his
colleagues would have remained prisoners by apartheid. 13
Seeking to avoid an all out war between whites and Africans and preserve
economic interests, members of Botha's cabinet and business leaders conducted secret
meetings with banned and imprisoned political leaders including Mandela in various
world locations. The initial meetings held some promise, but also illustrated how far
apart Africans and Afrikaners really were. In 1986, during the first meeting of
representatives of the apartheid establishment and exiled officials of the ANC in New
York, Seretse Choabe, an African freedom fighter, vowed to shoot Pieter de Lange, an
Afrikaner patriot, in front of 40 witnesses. "In coming to New York, both sides had
12 Thompson, 224-6.
13
Johannes Rantete & Giliomee, 'Transition to Democracy through Transaction," African Affairs , vol. 91
as cited by Sisk, 72.
13
violated the chief political commandment of the day, that the ANC should meet the
Afrikaner only on the field of battle."
14
While the secret meetings took place at home and abroad, random acts of violence
against the white establishment continued, but under the state of emergency, the South
African press could not fully report the severity of the events. When the state-controlled
press did cover the story it portrayed random acts of violence as black-on-black, but the
international press portrayed the same acts as white versus black. 1 By 1989, Afrikaners
support of Botha and his policy waned, the National Party received 52 percent of the
popular majority votes in the 1,987 election and South Africa's citizens had begun to
experience the economic hardships wrought by international sanctions. The Afrikaner
Broederbond - a highly influential secret society established in 1919 that promoted the
cause of Afrikaner nationalism and the NP - led by Pieter de Lange, began promoting a
move away from apartheid. 16 Even high ranking officials in Botha's administration felt
"it [was] now time to sit down with the [ANC] with whom [Boers] were in conflict, and
thrash out something we can all live with." 17 With increased division among the ruling
elites, the status quo was no longer a viable option in South Africa.
14
Patti Waldmeir, Anatomy of a Miracle (New York: WW Norton and Co.. 1997) 63.
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17 Mike Louw head of South African Secret Service under Botha as quoted in Waldmeir, 50.
14
C. Negotiation and Transition to a Free Election
When Frederick Willem de Klerk became President on 14 August 1989 following
Botha's resignation, he was well aware of the current situation facing the apartheid
government. As leader of the white minority, de Klerk had three options:
• Continue the state of emergency and military enforcement of apartheid; thus
enslaving whites to an unjust and archaic government;
• Turn over the government and the future of the country to Africans, thus
seeking the same outcome as Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and other post-
colonial independent African nations; and
• Seek a negotiated settlement with blacks, thus continuing white participation
in the government and guiding South Africa into the twenty-first century.
With both Afrikaner reservation and personal foresight, de Klerk selected option three.
De Klerk faced a difficult task in presenting a united front, because any action he
took towards negotiation meant upsetting the fragile Boer state. To the international
observer, the South African issue was straightforward, but to Afrikaner's; it was a matter
of survival. Politically the Conservative Party (CP) challenged the NP, which had
English supporters. The Conservative Party broke away after the 1983 constitution
included Coloureds and right-wing Afrikaner groups like the Afrikaners Resistance
Movement (AWV), who opposed any concession to Africans, in the political process.
Both advocated the establishment of a separate Afrikaner homeland. Further, the state of
emergency had taken its toll on the military and security service. English-speakers
among others resisted the longstanding practice of conscription because of the "price it
15
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asked of young men." With economic conditions worsening for whites, the cost of a
continued state of emergency was less and less attractive. De Klerk finally realized that
the NP and ANC were at a stalemate and the benefits of negotiation far outweighed the
costs.
19 On 13 December 1989, de Klerk met with Mandela for the first time to discuss
preconditions for negotiation. The first meeting was somewhat awkward, but they agreed
to work together, in a marriage of convenience, not love.20
On 2 February 1990, de Klerk announced to the shock of Afrikaners and the
cheers of the international community and Africans alike that the state would lift the bans
on the ANC, PAC, and SACP and release Mandela from prison. As de Klerk opened the
door to negotiation, the CP and AWB viewed the action as surrendering to the enemy and
the end of South Africa. De Klerk did not intend to simply deign to majority rule, but to
ensure the futures of whites in South Africa by taking the first steps toward
rapprochement. A week after the announcement, de Klerk met with Mandela the second
time to plan Mandela's 1 1 February release after 27 years in prison.
As de Klerk attempted to reconcile whites, Mandela faced similar challenges as
he attempted to reconcile blacks. The ANC operated outside of South Africa's boarders
for 30 years and represented an establishment devoted to liberation comprised of various
factions, but united by skin color. Like whites, blacks also had extremist groups of
varying ideologies. The leftist PAC had a slogan of "one bullet, one settler" and the







the transition from movement to political party, the ANC would have to lower its
expectations of what its role would be in the future South Africa. On 16 February 1990,
the ANC formally agreed to direct talks with the de Klerk government.
The first formal meeting occurred in May 1990 and concluded with the signing of
a negotiated pact. The Groote Schuur Minute sought to clear obstacles that stood in the
way of negotiations; in particular, those relating to the release of political prisoners. The
Pretoria Minute did likewise on 6-7 August 1990. These negotiations formally ended
armed actions and related activities by the ANC or MK, which was a requirement by the
de Klerk administration for further negotiation. 22
Mandela's ANC party met violent resistance from IFP supporters in Natal and by
September, the violence spread into townships near Johannesburg. The IFP leader
Buthelezi broke from the ANC in 1979 choosing to accept apartheid homeland
sovereignty. By 1989, IFP supporters engaged in a low-intensity civil war against the
United Democratic Front (UDF) and ANC supporters. IFP and ANC clashes led to
increased civil unrest, which adversely affected negotiations. Mandela desperately
needed to unite Africans and on 31 January 1991, joint ANC-IFP delegations met in
Durban, marking the first meeting of Mandela and Buthelezi in 28 years. The meeting
attempted to unite the ANC and IFP, however "while there may have been mutual
recognition at the top, there simply was not the support of the accord from below."2
Perhaps intending to bring Africans closer under the ANC, Mandela withdrew from
21
Ottaway, 44.




negotiations on 18 May 1991 because de Klerk was reluctant to release all political
prisoners.
4 To relieve international sanctions and economic pressures, de Klerk removed
the apartheid government's cornerstones by repealing the Population Registration Act on
17 June 1991. The move created a climate for negotiations to continue.
As the ANC and IFP continued to negotiate, peripheral groups fought to remain
intact. A group representing religious and business leaders actively pursued
representation, which resulted in a National Peace Accord on 14 September. The
Afrikaner dominated military and security services attempted to maintain control of the
state, but violence, social unrest, and internal political views made it difficult to identify
the enemy. For example, in protest to the Peace Accord violence between various
African groups erupted near Johannesburg resulting in 121 deaths and 550 wounded.
Black members of the SAPS found themselves targeted by these groups as white
sympathizers. As negotiations were reshaping South Africa's future, protection of the
force and civilians became a complex task. The increased violence and uncertain future
alarmed white citizens, but in March of 1992, they voted overwhelmingly (67.8 percent)
to back de Klerk's reforms and continued negotiations.23 The ANC and NP both realized
and feared that CP sympathizers in the military and security forces could disrupt reform,
if they wanted. "Mandela had visions of right-wing Afrikaners - heavily armed, trained,









In August 1992, members of the ANC, NP, CP and PAC agreed to attend
reconvened multiparty talks. By September, they reached a Record of Understanding,
which charted the transition's future and included the following:*&
• An elected constituent assembly would serve as interim Parliament;
• A new constitution would be drafted;
• The Assembly would be bound by principles agreed to by CODESA;
• The Assembly would have "deadlock-breaking mechanisms;" and
• An interim government would be established comprised of "national and
regional government"
27
During the talks, members of the IFP and white right-wing groups formed the Concerned
South Africans Group (COSAG). COSAG opposed the Record of Understanding
because it recognized that if new regime portrayed its members as extremists, it would
28
exclude them from political power. The government negotiated with the IFP, but in
February 1993, it failed to win IFP backing of the power-sharing arrangement.
The next step in the negotiation process was to implement Record of
Understanding. Actors established the Multiparty Negotiating Process (MPNP) in the
spring of 1993 after Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) failed to unite
negotiations. The MPNP included 26 registered political parties that sought to draft the
interim constitution and establish the 27 April 1994 election date. 30 The IFP and COSAG
allies objected to the election date and in July of 1993, the IFP withdrew from the MPNP.
For Buthelezi, "Inkatha had little incentive to turn into a democratic political party. Zulu
7









nationalism was a better card.'
01 Armed right-wing white terrorists attacked MPNP.
These terrorists "despised their president even more than they hated Mandela. They
believed de Klerk had betrayed the Afrikaner nation."32 On 25 June 1993, armed
militants stormed the MPNP, which increased political violence throughout South Africa.
By November of 1993 the ANC, its allies, and the National Party signed a peace
agreement. However, the agreement did not include the white right wing or IFP, both of
which demanded a separate peace. 33
In late 1993, the international community lifted economic sanctions and presented
de Klerk and Mandela with the Nobel Peace Price for their ability to negotiate stability in
South Africa. However, the enforcement of free elections fell to the military and security
services. Civil-unrest seemed at an all-time high just before the elections. Rioting in the
former homeland of Bophuthatswana and attacks by IFP marchers against the ANC
headquarters in downtown Johannesburg left nearly a hundred dead, and forced the
government to declare a state of emergency in KwaZulu. The security forces that
maintained control over apartheid subjects now had to ensure their safety and access to
vote. The military had to deal with the idea that "while good soldiers were entitled to
believe that the ANC should not be trusted, their obedience to political command was at
stake. . .which touched their own claim of being apolitical."34 Despite the civil-unrest, the









maintaining security at election sites. On April 27 1994, voters elected the ANC's
Nelson Mandela as leader and president.
D. The Post-apartheid South African State
South Africa is a parliamentary democracy whose highest and most important law
of the land is the Constitution, which took effect on 4 February 1997. The Constitution
outlines government structured at national, provincial, and local levels with powers of
legislative, executive, and judicial authorities separate from one another (Figure 2.1).
With the second election in 1999, the South African state is well on the way to
consolidation, but many hurdles remain including social and infrastructure issues and
institutional overhauls. The retirement of Mandela from politics in June of 1999 marks
the "end of the beginning," for the post-apartheid South African state. The second
democratic election saw the ANC increase its majority to 66 percent, and launched South
Africa into the post-Mandela era. Today, South Africans, regardless of ethnic
background, maintain control of the state through a parliamentary democratic process.
The ANC holds the 266 of the 398 seats, however thirteen other parties also received
seats in the National Assembly. 35 The pattern of politics within the state remains largely
along racial lines. With the election of Mbeki, the ANC crushed its old radical rivals for
the black vote and consolidated its position as an allegedly racial party, which causes
some uneasiness among those who fear the rise of ruthless Africanist tendencies. The
35 South Africa Yearbook 1999 , 35.
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two main opposition parties concerned are the Pan African Congress (PAC) and the
Azanian People's Organization (AZAPO) 36
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Figure 2.1 - Structure and Function of the South African
Government
The state must ensure compliance of the four core tasks as stated in the Preamble
to the Constitution. These functions are as follows:
• Heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic
values, social justice and fundamental human rights;
36 William Gutteridge, South Africa: Potential of Mbeki's Presidency , Research Institute for the Study of
Conflict, (Conflict Studies 319/320: Jun 1999), 21.
22
• Improve the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of each person;
• Lay the foundations for a democratic and open society in which government is
based on the will of the people and every citizen is equally protected by law;
and
• Build a united and democratic South Africa able to take its rightful place as a
sovereign state in the family of nations.
Internally, the government has integrated existing institutions and in many cases
redesigned them to include Africans in the political process. Externally, the focus
remains on attracting foreign investments, which has been slow due largely to the civil
unrest in many South African cities; continued African renaissance, inclusion into the
global community and regional democratic peace building by inclusion in the Southern
African Development Community (SADC). It is these internal and external challenges
that influence the future force structures.
E. Future Problems Beyond Transition
The negotiations in South Africa had a simple premise: Africans could not have
an all African South Africa and whites could not exclude Africans from the political
process. After the negotiations, each party and internal state-institutions began to reform.
Although democracy prevailed, various factions remained in the provinces: "the
repudiation of apartheid did not mean the end of racial divisions... [Voters] still cast their
ballots largely along racial and ethnic lines."38
37
Preamble to the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.
38
Rita M. Byrnes, ed., South Africa: a country study (Headquarters Department of the Army, 1997) xlvii.
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The military's transition included incorporation of members of the MK, IFP, and
homeland militias groups that had been the enemy became members of the new South
African National Defense Force (formerly SADF). 39 From 1995 to 1998, the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission provided an opportunity for South Africans to publicly admit
the human rights violations that occurred between 1960 and 1994 under the apartheid
system and granted amnesty to violators including military, security force, liberation, and
government personnel.
40
For South Africa to move forward it had to deal with the past.
Nevertheless, removing South Africa's legacy of apartheid and changing longstanding
beliefs is a long-term process that requires the sustained commitment of the nation's
leaders and its people, many of whom are members of disparate groups.
White society, which historically viewed itself as pseudo-European and enjoyed
European prosperity under apartheid, has realized that it must now deal with traditional
African issues. These issues include balanced education, employment, health services,
crime, and domestic investment. Since the first election in 1994, the society has
undergone significant challenges. Unemployment among Africans is 50 percent; among
whites, it is 10 percent.
41
African access to education and healthcare is far less than that
of whites. Every government agency has integrated across racial lines and, with the
addition of Africans in the political process, begun to remove the racist perceptions
wrought by apartheid. Perhaps the most remarkable impact of the transition is that the
military and security services, which enforced apartheid policies by violent means, now
39 James Winkates, 'The transformation of the South African National Defense Force," Armed Forces and
Society ,: Spring 2000.
40
Antjie Krog, Country of My Skull (South Africa: Random House, 1998) ix.
41 World Fact Book 2000
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protect all South Africans. Nevertheless, continued integration, force reduction, and
mission changes continue to challenge the military. The legitimacy of the military and
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III. CURRENT FORCE STRUCTURE
Apartheid has affected the current relationship between the military and society.
Following the NP negotiated concession of power to the ANC in 1994; the apartheid
military was one of the first government institutions to undergo radical redirection.
Today, the Department of Defense is in the midst of a second comprehensive
transformation of its design, structure and force levels and is using business principles
and practices to do so. The White Paper on Defense and a major Defence Review
Process are the transformation's cornerstones.
4
The long-term recommendation of the Ministry of Defense (MoD) was a SA
peacetime force of 36,000 full-time and 98,000 Reserve Force members. An acceptable
and more constrained option is 22,000 full-time and 70,000 Reserve members. These
figures incorporate only combat personnel, not combat service support and service
support personnel.
44
This chapter will address the new South African National Defense
Force (SANDF); the force that superceded the South African Defense Force (SADF) and
the Ministry of Defense after the initial restructuring that started in 1990. The chapter
will address
• The South African Department of Defense;
• Challenges facing the current force structure;
• Integration of the military and homeland defense and elements;
• SANDF' s role and mission today;
43
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Challenges to the existing reserves.
A. The South African Department of Defense
Beginning in 1990, government has decreased the Defense budget annually.
Current defense expenditure represents less than 2 percent of GDP, down from the
apartheid average of 16 percent.
45
These changes in government spending and allocation
have been the driving force behind reorganization and transformation within the
Department of Defence (DoD). According to the Defence Review the DoD must "...
achieve maximum cost efficiency yet ensure effectiveness."46 The vision for the next
four to ten years is appropriation of resources to be 40 percent on personnel, 30 percent
on operation, and 30 percent on capital renewal.47 At present, there is no appropriation
set aside for the Reserve Force.
The DoD strategy to ensure the protection of the State and its people includes the
following:
• Political, economic and military cooperation with other states and the
prevention, management and resolution of conflict through non-violent
means;
• South Africa will turn to military means only when deterrence and non-violent
strategies have failed;
• Ensure the existence of a defense capability which is sufficiently credible to
inhibit potential aggressors; and
45
46 D Leview 1 )8, 76
Ibid, 381.




Ensure a core defense capability with the ability to expand to appropriate
r_ . _ , i_ 48
force levels
With the transition from apartheid to democracy, the government established the
primary goal of civilian control of the military, but the reorganization is not complete.
During the apartheid era, the Department of Defense (DoD) operated with little
parliamentary oversight, with the Defense Headquarters performing most of its functions.
In the interests of entrenching democratic civil-military relations, the Defense
Amendment Act of 1995 provided for a restructured DoD, which comprises the SANDF
and civilian Defense Secretariat.4 Figure 3.1 illustrates the current organizational
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Figure 3.1 Organizational Structure of the Department of Defense South Africa
South African Defence Review 1998 , 53.
48 White Paper on Defence , 13.
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Ibid, 9.
50 At the time of this publication, the organizational and relationship structure was still in the final phases of
approval. The information used in the paper represents that already published in the Defence Review
1998 .
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Today, the military consists of four specialized and combined services - Army,
Air Force, Navy, and the Military Health Service - collectively known as the South
African National Defense Force (SANDF). The President is the Commander-in-Chief of
the armed forces, while the administrative responsibility is a function of the Defense
Minister, whom the President appoints President. The President also appoints the chief
of the armed forces from one of the four military branches. The SANDF chief is
accountable to the Minister of Defense, who is a civilian. 51
Evidence that military has already assumed some of the missions designed to
improve social perceptions is apparent. Before the elections, the military distributed
ballots and set up voting stations in many of the homelands and provinces. Other
elements, within the services, have assisted police in fighting drug traffic, quelling social
unrest, and providing back up support to police missions.52 However, although the
missions have changed, the elements resemble apartheid forces in name and uniform.
Even though in the new democracy, they are "here to help," units like Commandos,
conjure fear and distaste among the African civilian population, because of apartheid
brutalities. This distrust creates challenges regarding legitimacy within the military
ranks, state, and society. The Reserve Force will have to overcome these past
perceptions of military personnel and elite-specialized units if it is to succeed. 5
51




Interviews with Lekoa Solomon Mollo, COL SANDF (NPS: March 2000).
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B. Challenges Facing the Current Force Structure
South Africa has attempted to institute greater civilian control of the military and
reduced its size while inculcating a greater sense of military professionalism. This design
of the re-engineering effort is to improve the MoD's capacity to efficiently meet the
country's security requirements within budget and policy constraints.54 A difficult
challenge is creating a military that reflects the country's social demographics. The
military's history, especially during the Botha years, coupled with the observation that
civil-military relations mirror the society and political regime in which they develop,
makes this a difficult task.
The military should reflect South Africa's racial make-up, but that is not the case.
The SANDF has moved closer to a more representative military, but as figure 3.2
illustrates, the proportion of whites and blacks in the military does not accord with their
proportions in the total population. Further, racially integrating the military forces
developed under apartheid created more challenges.
54 South African Yearbook 1999 . 258.
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Figure 3.2 Percentage of Total Population Partitioned by Race and Percentage in the Ministry of Defense
(MoD) Personnel
South Africa Yearbook 1999.
C. Integration of the Separate Militaries
Since 26 April 1994, the DoD has been incorporating seven former forces and the
Kwa-Zulu Self Protection Force into one SANDF. The government created an
Integration Committee (IC), comprised of representatives from all service arms, former
forces, and functional staff divisions to oversee the integration process. Under the terms
of Section 224 and 236 of the Interim Constitution (1993), the following groups
comprised SANDF when it was established.
• Members of the South African Defense Force (SADF);
• Members of any defense force forming part of a national territory, i.e., the
former Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, and Ciskei defense forces; and
32
• Members of a defense force or armed force of a political organization, which
included Um Khonto we Sizwe (MK) and the Azanian Peoples' Liberation
Army (APLA).55
These militaries were adversaries under apartheid, but during the transition, they
treated each other professionally. Of the 28,000-registered MK and 6,000 APLA
members, of the total force, 16,000 accepted integration, while 9,330 members of the
SADF— 7,000 whites — opted for demobilization and accepted severance packages. 56
Ensuring the force's racial equality in the various units is difficult, but is proceeding.
The South African government used two systems, Rationalization and
Retrenchment, to incorporate the different forces and manpower and personnel changes to
achieve a force capable of meeting the county's security requirements. This has been a
difficult task. The Personnel Rationalization Strategy for the DoD, states that an
individual must meet certain criteria to qualify for retrenchment. These criteria include:
• Individual Experience. The member's level of expertise and past work
performance; these two criteria should be applied as a last resort and not as the
main criteria when considering an individual for retrenchment.
• Course Requirements. An individual receives two chances to successfully
complete all the required courses for his or her present rank.
• Physical and Psychological Abilities. This refers to the extent to which an
individual's skills meet the requirements of a specific job.
• Disciplinary Record; Based on type, seriousness, frequency, surrounding
circumstances, and impact on work performance.
• Domestic Circumstances. These include member status, management of
married couples, financial position of member, and normal age distribution
within the personnel structure.
55




In six years, this process has enabled the DoD to reduce personnel by nearly 35
percent.
57 However, according to the Defense Minister Mosiuoa Lekota, "the process has
taken much longer than was originally anticipated. Integration has been both a
complicated and sensitive process, fraught with difficulties, but overall it has been
successful."
5
Further, as illustrated in Figure 3.3, an imbalance remains between the
various forces, which has led to internal military problems. Lekota continues to support
rationalization but critics like former Chief of the SADF, Johan Pretorius, characterized
rationalization as a "no-win situation for the SANDF: there will be a loss of expertise if
former members of the SADF are released, and a loss of legitimacy if former non-
statutory forces are discharged."
59
Among the more obvious challenges associated with the integration process is the
senior leadership's racial makeup. While Africans have long served in the UDF, SADF,
and SANDF, whites have always dominated the senior leadership positions. According
Mr. Lekota, between 70 and 80 percent of the officers in the SANDF came from the
former SADF, where whites filled senior posts. Mr. Lekota and senior cabinet members
have sought qualified Africans to fill top positions, but since the apartheid state denied
Africans access to appropriate education opportunities under apartheid, filling these
positions will take time. In reality, if the government remains committed to a racially
proportioned military, white soldiers will be the ones discharged.
57
According to IOL, since 1994, soldiers from the non-statutory forces as MK and APLA had joined the
SANDF. The state then trimmed the huge force from 120,00 to 75.000 members.
58 Taken from "Lekota: Defence Budget Vote 2000/01, National Assembly, 7 April 2000," (Pretoria) 3.
59 The statement originally appeared in the first Draft White Paper (1995), p. 32, and later referenced in
Winkates, 463.
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*= NEW RECRUITS TAKEN INTO SERVICE SINCE
Figure 3.3 Schematic Representation of Integrated SANDF as on 1 April 1998.
Defence Review. 70.
According to the 1998 Defence Review, there are 183 senior leadership positions
(Brigadier General, Major General, Lieutenant General, and General) and only 41
positions filled by non-whites - 40 by Africans, and 1 by a Colored.60 In 1998, the
SANDF introduced "fast tracking" for members who have the potential to qualify sooner
than would normally be the case, "fast-tracking" has led to placing suitable members in a
succession of posts to gain the necessary experience.61 In the past two years, more
Africans fill top positions, but the change in leadership has alienated some military
60
Defence Review . 71.
Ibid, 72.
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members. In an address to soldiers at the SANDF's Support Base in Pietersburg in North
West after the killing of a Major by a fellow soldier, Mr. Lekota was uneasy about the
percentage of apartheid era officers in the current SANDF. He questioned the SANDF's
practice of basing their force structure on whether service members were in the statutory
or non-statutory forces. To him, this distinction was unacceptable. He said the following
to his detractors, "Soldiers who do not feel loyal to the black command structure of the
army should leave and go elsewhere." According to the South African Defence Union,
the largest military union in Africa, one challenge produced by the discharge of former
soldiers, is that many of the estimated 40,000 soldiers that left the military in the past six
years have turned to crime to survive.
The Minister of Defense launched the Service Corps on 31 January 1995, as an
auxiliary service to the SANDF. Its mission was "assisting in the reintegration of ex-
service members into civil society by upgrading the standard of education, vocational and
life skills to enable members to find employment or start their own enterprise in the
private sector and career guidance on a continuous basis."63 However, with only 137
full-time employees, the program has had difficulty in dealing with the large number of
customers, lack of funding, and high civilian unemployment rates. Future reductions in
end strength due to reutilization and rationalization require a more effective method of
transition.
62
IOL, "Lekota: SANDF full of apartheid-era officers," 17 JUL 00 and "Serve black command or quit
Lekota warns," 17 AUG 00.
63 Defence Review , 90.
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D. Role and Mission of the SANDF
According to the South African Constitution (Act 108 of 1996), "The primary
object of the Defence Force is to defend and protect the Republic, its territorial integrity
and its people in accordance with the Constitution and the principles of international law
regulating the use of force."
64 The Constitution does not clearly state secondary
objectives or functions of the SANDF but, according to Transitional Arrangements, the
state may employ the SANDF in the following areas:
• The defense of the Republic, for the protection of its sovereignty and
territorial integrity;
• Compliance with the international obligations of the Republic with regard to
international bodies and other states;
• Preservation of life, health, or property;
• The provision or maintenance of essential services;
• Upholding law and order in the Republic in cooperation with the South
African Police Service under circumstances set out in law where the Police
Service is unable to maintain law and order on its own; and
• Support of any department of state for the purpose of socio-economic
improvement.65
The provision that the SANDF "may be employed" has stimulated open debates as to
what the military's force structure should be. Anti-military supporters argue that today's
pressing need for social spending on such crucial issues as health, education, housing,
crime and violence, the instability and high level of intra-state conflict, and the apparent
64
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. Act No. 108 of 1996 Chapter 1 1 Section 200 (2).
65
Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993. Act No. 200 of 1993 Chapter 14 Section 227
(1).
37
absence of a clearly defined military threat to South Africa.66 As the debate continues,
the SANDF struggles with unclear mission requirements both internally and externally.
The importance of South Africans cannot disregard their role in the security of
Southern Africa as a whole. The SANDF continues to train for peacekeeping operations.
Following 1998 peace operations in Lesotho by members of the SANDF and the
Botswana Defense Force under the auspices of the Southern African Development
Community (SADC), neighboring states have increasingly requested assistance in
training and support in peacekeeping operations from South Africa; most recently the
Congo. The SANDF' s strengths include expertise in communications, mine clearing,
command and control, and medical support strengths, which would support future
peacekeeping deployments. The democracies in Southern Africa are fragile and the need
for a small well-trained and equipped force, coupled with the current rise of civil unrest
in Zimbabwe, justifies the SANDF.
Internally, the SANDF has been an integral weapon against increasing crime. The
SANDF worked jointly with the SAPS in all violent trouble spots and high crime areas to
re-establish law and order particularly in the Richmond, KwaZulu-Natal area, which had
become notorious for its violence. The most common operations were roadblocks,
cordon and search operations, and patrols. Most recently the SANDF participated in the
state sponsored Operation Good Hope in the Western Cape to eliminate drug trafficking
66
For example, MG L.N. Le Roux or the South African DoD, "A Determination of South African Defense




and gang warfare. The SANDF's capabilities regarding domestic issues was evident in
the after action reports.
According to the 1998 crime prevention statistics, the SANDF accounted for:
• Confiscation of 3, 161 illegal weapons,
• Recovery of 776 stolen vehicles,
• Recovery of 1 ,409 head of livestock,
• Apprehension of 35,383 illegal immigrants, and
• Seizure of 60,201 kg of dagga and 17,794 Mandrax tablets68
The SANDF has also assumed full responsibility for border control, thus releasing the
SAPS members for other duties. Although the DoD and SSD are developing plans to
withdraw the SANDF from policing roles, the success of SANDF and SAPS cooperative
efforts underscores the value of this relationship as part of the National Crime Prevention
Strategy. However, such employment requires Presidential authorization, legislative
regulation, and is subject to the Bill of Rights and parliamentary approval.69 The SANDF
has no powers of arrest, detention, or search and seizure, however, so future actions must
be limited to threats to constitutional order, such as armed extremist elements, threats
from paramilitary forces, large scale political instability, or mass civil disobedience.
68 South Africa Yearbook 1999 . 262.
69
Defence Review , 27.
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E. Structural Concepts
To facilitate a more rapid response, the Department of Defence created a three-
tier organization consisting of a Ministry of Defence, an Intermediate Level, and a Unit
Level. The Intermediate structures between the Ministry and the Unit Level consist of
task forces, type formations, and support formations, which replace existing territorial
commands. Task Forces are mission driven and their organization lasts for the duration
of the assignment. Type Formations are the basic building blocks for force projection,
and each formation has its own commander. They include, where practical, all units, and
support elements related to a specific user type.
Some examples of Type Formations by the different arms of service are:
• Army - artillery or armor formations
• Air Force - fighter system group
• Navy - the fleet (only one)
• Military health service - mobile medical formations
In a Type Formation, combat and support units are concentrated and supported by a base
in a specific geographical location. This organization allows the DoD to tailor force
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Currently, the DoD maintains 26 bases throughout South Africa (Figure 3.4) to
support its Type Formations. With the dramatic decrease in military spending, base























& Large Base > 3 500 3
Medium Base 1 500-3 499 13
• Small Base < 1 500 10
TOTAL 26
Figure 3.4 Locations of South African Military Bases
Defence Review , 58.
F. Challenges of the Existing Reserve Force
In May of 1999, to become similar to National Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) organizations, the DoD renamed the former Part-time component of the SANDF
the Reserve Force (RF) and appointed the Chief of the Part-time Component as Chief of
Defence Reserves. Other components under his command include the Army
Conventional Reserve and the Army Territorial Reserve. The Army Territorial Reserve
includes the Commandos, the Air Force Reserve, the Naval Reserve, and the South
41
African Medical Health Reserve. According to the Defence Review, "the core force
approach of the DoD relies extensively on the expansion capability inherent in the Part-
time Component." However, this force is dependent on the readiness and resources of
the RF and requires societal acceptance impacted by apartheid memories.
Currently, there is no single strategic framework, training doctrine, or resource
allocation Model for the RF to plan for future contingencies. Further, the RF's limited
budget, based on pre- 1990 compulsory service,71 and lack of organizational cohesion
remains the biggest factors affecting the success of the organization. Approximately 95
percent of RF members serve with the army, so any reform will be in the ground forces.
Since service in the RF is voluntary, the Defence Review addressed issues of pay
and compensation recommending that pay be on par with members of SANDF. These
recommendations included creating a pension or provident fund for volunteers and a
bonus system "sufficient to allow the acquisition of a major appliance... or contribute
significantly towards annual holiday... and for tax-free or a marginal rate for Reserve
pay." However, the DoD does not have the resources needed to implement these
proposals.
72
Volunteers currently undergo twelve months of basic military training,
followed by eight obligatory annual commitments of thirty days each in the Reserve
conventional forces. For new recruits, the report recommends revised basic training at
the unit level, non-continuous training on weeknights and weekends, and a maximum of
fourteen days continuous training, preferably in the member's local area. Currently no
71




legislation protects the volunteer's employment rights, which has led to employer
resistance to the RF and in extreme cases, restrictive company personnel policies against
voluntary service.
G. ARGUMENTS
The RF represents a significant opportunity for the overall defense of South
Africa, but using the force will require funding, legislation, social change and popular
acceptance of it. Further, for the MoD to effectively employ the RF it must continue to
streamline the Territorial and Regular Reserves into a unified RF. The Reserve Force
Council (RFC) is key to this success. Created in 1992, the RFC consists of
representatives of all RF bodies, former non-statutory members, and a SANDF member,
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IV. RESERVE FORCE OPTIONS AND RATIONALIZATION
Given the economic and social factors within South Africa, the benefit of having a
trained and integrated Reserve Force (RF) as part of a total force package is both cost
effective and appropriate. This chapter examines requirements for force structure of the
RF and implementation in terms of potential benefits in South Africa. There are eight









A. Economics of Force Restructure
South Africa's limited and dwindling defense budget justifies RF involvement,
and accordingly, the cost effectiveness of RF integration is a paramount concern.
Nevertheless, based on the Core Force concept, there are limitations to what the RF can
do. The success of the RF is dependent on its ability to integrate into the Active
Component (AC). Thus, it is unrealistic to assume that even the most highly trained RF
replace the AC, or operate outside of AC policies and guidelines. The RF must be part of
the total defense budget.
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Constrained resources are common in most militaries, including the US. There
are certain aspects of US force planning that illustrate the value of RF utilization. The
Army Guard's budget for Fiscal Year 1999 is $6.4 Billion dollars, which equates to
approximately 10 percent of the Army's budget and less than 2.5 percent of the
Department of Defense Budget. The Army National Guard (ARNG), however, maintains
more than half of the Army's total combat power and approximately one-third of its
Combat Support and Combat Service support.74 South Africa's overall military budget
is considerably less than that of the United States, but the apportionment of Guard to
Regular forces accords well.
The RF is more affordable because citizen-soldiers require payment only when
mobilized for training or mission support. They do not require permanent housing,
medical care, or family support centers. Facilities or training areas require a skeleton
workforce to perform general maintenance and upkeep, drastically reducing the draw on
limited budgets. Presently, there is no budgetary oversight for RF expenditure.
B. Role and Mission
In the United States, the National Guard has a unique dual-mission that consists of
both Federal and State roles. Although the force's primary mission is to serve as a Federal
Reserve force, the Guard has an equally important role in support of states and local
communities. The state executive (generally the Governor) commands Guard units except
74 Army Guard Information Page, http://www.arng.ngb.armv.mil/home/guardinfo/guardinfonew.htm
(Accessed 25 November 2000).
46
when they support a federal mission, which requires Congressional approval. In this
capacity, they complete required training, generally one-weekend a month for refresher
training and two weeks out of the year for comprehensive training, and are the first
military to respond in states during emergencies. This system is effective because the
Guard provides quick response during domestic crisis including natural disaster relief,
fire fighting, crowd control, and civil disobedience, and is available to augment AC
missions.
In South Africa, the RF responded to various domestic crises including support to
the SAPS, boarder security missions, and response to a new outbreak of foot-and-mouth
disease that threatened the country's meat export industry. However, the RF lacks a
clearly defined mission and role. According to the White Paper on Defence, "For
political, strategic and economic reasons, the SANDF will be an all-volunteer force. It
will comprise a relatively small Regular Force, including a civilian component, which is
backed up by a. sufficiently large Part-Time Component (PTC)."75 Later, the description
changed: The PTC will consist of personnel who serve on a part-time basis when
required... organized, trained, and equipped in such a way that they are available for
deployment alongside Regular Force members. The language of back up and alongside
has led to some confusion as to the intended mission of the RF.76
From a US perspective, and one that applies to South Africa, the strength of the
RF is that units operate in local communities, and community members fill its ranks.
75 White Paper on Defence , 22.
76
For example, "Strategic Framework for the Reserve Force of the SANDF' (C DEF RES/D
RES/R/302/2).
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These members bring with them various non-military skills that prove useful in times of
domestic crisis. For that reason, the primary near-term mission of the RF should focus on
the internal domestic issues that plague the society and the secondary roles that the AC
cannot complete due to downsizing and regional security issues. These secondary
missions include:
• Disaster Relief;
• The provision and maintenance of essential services;
• Search and rescue; and
"7*7
• Evacuation of South African citizens from high-threat areas.
C. Force Integration Requirements
Integration is the ability of the RF to join with the AC during times of
mobilization and encompasses a wide range of issues. They are:
• Legitimacy; not just within the military but acceptance by the civilian
population;
• Command and control;
• Training;
• Employer support; and
• Recruiting and retention.
South Africa has determined that a core force is necessary. The success of the Reserve
Force requires the existence of a core active military component; the RF cannot totally
replace the AC.
77 White Paper on Defence , 19.
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In the United States, debates about integration continue, but as the last ten years
illustrate, with improved training relationships, joint exercises, and concurrent
deployments, the AC and RC work as combined defense team. The South African DoD
and MoD must place the same importance on seamless integration when it comes to
increased RF involvement.
1. Legitimacy
Citizens, the military, and the state must accept the RF if it is to be legitimate.
The Defence Review highlights key elements that would legitimize the RF:
• Ensure the [RF] reflects the principles of the Constitution and the policies
contained in the White Paper on Defence;
• Ensure that the [RF] meets the requirements of the SANDF;
• Ensure that the [RF] reflects the composition and cultural diversity of South
Africa;
• That it remains an integral part of the SANDF's force design and structure;
• Capable of fulfilling its functions in an efficient and effective manner; and
• Service conditions of the [RF] are designed to attract and retain sufficient
volunteers to meet the SANDF's force level requirements.78
The most difficult factor in gaining social support and legitimacy for the RF in
communities is changing their apartheid perceptions of RF members, mainly
Commandos. Future RF missions must focus on supporting the community to offset any
negative memories of apartheid.
78
Defence Review , 92-3.
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Although the SAPS are the state's primary law-enforcement, the presence of a
legitimate RF unit in a high crime area, like Cape Town, where vigilante groups have
taken action against criminals and residents are desperate for protection and distrustful of
the police, could foster a sense of community support and improve civil-military
relationships. The state has already deployed members of the RF in co-operation with the
SAPS. "Because of their dual role as citizens and soldiers, [they] have displayed a high
level of maturity and have been a stabilizing influence in these operations."1 ' Integrated
Commando units have deployed during elections and provided polling station security,
have provided support to local authorities in flood and snow relief, and have cooperated
with the SAPS to fight crime.
A well organized, equipped, trained, and controlled RF can enhance civil-military
relations in a state because the RF has close ties with the community, broadly represents
society, and has strong ties to the military ties. (Figure 4.1).
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Since the members of a Reserve Force live and serve in the communities, society is more
likely to accept them and, in turn, gain a better understanding of military affairs and
culture. While in uniform the reservist brings firsthand knowledge of civilian affairs to
the military, thus enhancing the overall relationship.
2. Command and Control
Command and control presents a unique set of challenges in South Africa. These
include:
• Incorporating various Part-time components and territorial units under the
new RF structure;
• Restructuring and disbandment of unnecessary PTC units; and
• Uniform and equipment of the various reserve forces.
The role and success of the RF is dependent on shared command and
control/management and the involvement of the RF in decision making at all levels,
including Divisional and Corporate HQ level. 80 As Figure 1.2 showed, the Chief of the
Part-time Component (CPTC) reports to the Chief SANDF. The relationship between the
CPTC and CSANDF requires attention, but it appears on track. A Part-time Forum
meeting in early 1998 captured one of the main challenges in the Command and Control
relationship: there is "a gap between policy relating to the PTC and the implementation
80
Mission Success Factors as defined in "Strategic Framework for the Reserve Force of South Africa," par
24, sect. c.
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of that policy, particularly with regard to the allocation of resources."81 This implies that
the RF is at the mercy of the SANDF.
According to the Defence Review, the aspects of command and control include the
following:
• The [RF] and the [RFC] should be involved in force design and rationalization
initiatives affecting the RF;
• Restructuring of the command and control structures of the RF within the
SANDF;
• Design of a program for accelerated training and development of RF
members; and
• Transformation of the SANDF must foster a common military culture
amongst both AC and RF members.
The creation and incorporation of the RFC has provided a major step toward including
RF in defense planning. Nevertheless, without a clear mandate about RF funding, the
effectiveness of the RF is questionable.
3. Training
Training must adhere to mission requirements, and presently there is no
overarching strategy for RF in South Africa. To achieve seamless integration, the MoD
must establish unilateral standards for all military personnel, include AC members in the
training evaluation process, and provide resources and opportunities for RF training. In
the United States, individual training and education requirements of the citizen-soldier
mirror that of the active component. For example, all soldiers attend the same initial
basic training while officers attend branch qualification and most specialty training
81
Department of Defence: South Africa, (Bulletin 35/98, 17 June 1998) 1.
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courses alongside their active-duty counterparts. Although much of the Guard's training
focuses on Platoon level tasks and below (due to limited resources), larger scale training
takes place continually, often using the Army's combat training centers. The AC
provides training evaluation, incorporated with reserve commander evaluations, ensures
the reserve forces adhere to the established standards and assist reserve component
training at battalion and brigade levels through regional Training Support Brigades
(TSB). Integrated training and AC evaluations of RF training enabled exchanges




As experience in the United States shows, the relationship between citizen
soldiers and their employers is paramount to the success of the organization. For that
reason, the US has legislation that protects the individual's job and employment when
they serve Active Duty. Currently, South Africa has no such legislation.
The South African government has begun to educate employers about the new
force structure and voluntary service requirements with the establishment of the National
Defence Liaison Council (NLDC). The Primary mission of the voluntary NLDC is to
"communicate actively with, and advise and generate support from, employers, organized
Army Guard Information Page
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labor and the community for the Reserve Force." 8 Key to gaining employer support is
marketing the skills the employee receives while on active duty. These skill include:
• Leadership and Management Skills. Reservists are taught, develop and use
essential personnel management, instructional and administrative abilities;
• Work Values. Reserve training supports the development of important
attitudes and values such as personal discipline, loyalty, accountability, and
integrity, until they become second nature; and
• Specific Occupation Training. Many reservists undergo trades related
training that may be directly transferable to the civilian workplace.
As the dependency on the RF grows, it is imperative the SANDF and government
recognize the employers for their support and dedication to the service member.
5. Recruiting and Retention
Recruiting and retention depends on a clear and integrated force structure concept.
Presently, recruiting practices of the RF, SANDF, and PTC in South Africa appear
fragmented. The Minister of Defense mandated recruiting and retention practices in the
future of the RF. These include:
Recruiting must encourage nation-building;
Ensure a balanced mix of members in terms of race, ethnicity, and gender;
Encouraging members to stay through attractive, challenging, and rewarding
service;
Each arm of service should determine the number of recruits required for each
regiment. 84
83 uSouth African Reserve Force and Employer Support,"
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Defence Review , 98.
Under civilian control of the military, it is imperative the state dictate the size and force
structure of the armed forces based on budget and mission constraints with input from the
defense organizations. The MoD must maintain oversight and quality control over those
recruited even when recruiting and retention is decentralized.
Threat and mission determine the RF structure, but with the current high levels of
unemployment in South Africa, and the lack of skilled labor, the RF would be an
excellent job skills program for citizens. Service in the RF provides opportunities for
continued service by members of the SANDF. In the United States, service in the
Guard and Reserve enables members access to the G.I. Bill, educational opportunities,
skills training in computers, construction, equipment operation that correlate directly to
civilian employment. In turn, these skills enhance the overall quality of society.
Financial limitations hamper benefits to RF service, but South Africa is working
to enhance RF involvement. Recruiting and retention success depends on South Africa's
ability to determine the role and mission of the RF, providing meaning to RF
membership, and improving employer support.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
There are no easy solutions for South Africans as their democracy moves into the
twenty-first century. The euphoria created by the ending of apartheid has waned while
initial changes in force structure have placed the military under heavy stress. Integration
of the RF into the South African national defense strategy requires additional
commitment by society, government institutions and the military. Apartheid ghosts
remain present at every level of society and government and the challenges that lie ahead
require careful planning and combined effort. Nevertheless, the government must
continue in its process towards consolidation and redistribution of limited resources. The
economics and social issues within South Africa will continue to take precedence over
potential external factors and forces, but the potential for regional hostility provide
rationalization for a continued state military power.
The primary obstacles regarding RF integration into the SANDF are the support
and acceptance by the citizens and a need for clear state strategy regarding roles and
missions. The RF in itself does not solve the internal issues of South Africa. However,
with continued transformation and inclusion in the state security planning process, the RF
can
• Reduce defense budget requirements while enhancing the overall combat
capabilities of the SANDF through task force assistance;
• Create a larger more representative civilian participation in defense matters
through local RF units and improve apartheid perceptions of Commandos and
military personnel;
• Provide an opportunity for labor skill education to unskilled citizens, which
enhances the economic capabilities of South African citizens;
57
Provide assistance to local SAPS; and
Allow for international peacekeeping exchanges between South Africa and
other nations.
It is the state's responsibility to ensure the RF receives the necessary resources and
guidance to achieve the desired end state. These responsibilities are as follows:
• Allocate state funds specifically for the RF;
• Ensure soldiers receive pay and benefits equal to the active component;
• Pass legislation protecting citizen-soldier employer rights; and
• Establish and ensure uniform standards for all military personnel.
From an international standpoint, the existing democracies that supported South
Africa's transition from apartheid to democracy must be willing to provide support and
knowledge as the government seeks solutions to the difficult future defense and social
problems. Moreover, if the integration of the RF is successful in South Africa it will lead
to opportunities within the global and regional community to include increased
recognition by NATO, peacekeeping opportunities with southern Africa, and training
exchange with the United States. Further, other African and formerly militaristic states
can look to South Africa as an example of how a country can successfully meet the
demands of competing interests.
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